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The author of this article is Galo Nuño of the Associate Directorate General International Affai rs.1 
The severe financial imbalances generated in the advanced economies during the preced-
ing upturn are at the root of the current crisis and explain why, since 2008, a large number 
of developed countries have experienced the deepest recession of recent decades and 
why the recovery is taking place at such a slow pace. Chart 1 shows the strong contraction 
in GDP growth and the notable rise in the rate of unemployment in the cases of the United 
States, the United Kingdom and the euro area, 
The economic literature shows that recessions associated with financial crises are espe-
cially acute and prolonged.2 Studies underline that recessions associated with financial 
crises are the result of excessively optimistic expectations regarding the growth of income 
and wealth, which lead to a very pronounced expansion in the borrowing and leverage of 
private agents. When these expectations fail to materialise there is a sudden correction of 
private spending, which is all the greater the more extensive the imbalances that have built 
up in the private sector, and the subsequent economic recovery should preferably be sup-
ported by government and foreign demand, while firms and households rebuild their finan-
cial position. As seen in Chart 1, following the start of the current crisis, the private sector’s 
saving-investment balance has recovered significantly, while public sector finances have 
deteriorated, as a result of the operation of automatic stabilisers and the adoption of dis-
cretionary fiscal measures designed to reduce the impact of the recession. 
Given the observed similarity of the economic dynamics of different countries in the cur-
rent episode, this article analyses the extent to which this pattern of adjustment is in line 
with the historical evidence of previous crises and the foreseeable course of developments 
in the current recovery. It does this using a database with information on 46 financial crises 
during the period 1980-2008, and the dynamics of the main macroeconomic variables fol-
lowing the start of a crisis are studied. The characteristics of the phases of recovery of 
economies following a recessionary period largely depend on the nature of the expansion 
that preceded the recession (and, therefore, on the imbalances in the economy) and the 
prevailing macroeconomic policy framework. Consequently, this article explores the differ-
ences in the profile of recovery following a financial crisis in terms of the external position 
of the economy (current-account deficit or surplus) and the exchange rate regime in force 
at the beginning of the crisis. 
The degree of synchronisation of crises is a factor that has a decisive influence on the 
profile of the recovery. This is an additional obstacle in the current juncture, since the re-
cession has become global and many advanced economies are still handicapped by im-
balances. Indeed, the more global the crisis, the smaller the potential role of external de-
mand in the exit phase. The episodes included in the sample of financial crises used in this 
article did not have the geographic scope of the current one, which has been compared to 
the Great Depression of 1929-33 (the last great global financial crisis). That crisis led to a 
prolonged economic stagnation and continues to be an important reference in the design 
of macroeconomic policies. For this reason, a box is included reviewing the origin and 
Introduction
1  The author would like to thank Gabriel Aparicio, Álvaro Claudio and Richard Doval for technical assistance. 
2  See, for example, Terrones et al. (2009) and the references cited there.
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SOURCES: World Economic Outlook (WEO), Economist Intelligence Unit, OECD and World Bank.
a Forecast data obtained from the IMF (WEO April 2011). Year 0 = 2008. 
b The private balance is calculated as the difference between the current account balance and the budget balance. 
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evolution of the 1929 crisis, with special emphasis on the United States, then the central 
axis of the international monetary system, and the role of macroeconomic policies and the 
gold standard in the genesis and resolution of that crisis.
The comparison of the current recovery with other financial crisis exit phases may allow 
the short and medium-term growth prospects to be better assessed and the difficulties the 
advanced economies are having in restoring sustained growth rates similar to the pre-cri-
sis ones to be explained.
The analysis of the process of macroeconomic adjustment following the financial crisis 
presented in this article is based on a database containing information on the main mac-
roeconomic variables in financial crisis episodes in various countries (both advanced and 
emerging) during the period 1980-2008. The most important methodological aspects of 
the exercise are as follows: first, the dating of the financial crises is based on the Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2009) approach. They define a financial crisis as a situation involving the liq-
uidation, merger, acquisition or rescue, with public-sector involvement, of one or more fi-
nancial institutions, whether or not as a result of a bank run.3 With the data available, 46 
financial crises in 29 countries were identified.
Two criteria have been used to divide up the sample of financial crisis episodes: the sign 
of the current-account balance and the exchange rate regime existing at the moment be-
fore the outbreak of the crisis. The sample includes 34 crises in which the country con-
cerned started with a current-account deficit. Of these, 24 occurred in countries with fixed 
exchange rates and the other ten in economies with flexible ones. The twelve remaining 
episodes took place in countries with current-account surpluses at the onset of the crisis. 
In this case, owing to the small number, no sub-division has been made.4 
The article focuses on the analysis of the evolution of various macroeconomic varia-
bles at around the time the financial crisis occurs, in accordance with the dating made.5 
For this purpose, the charts that show the main results also show the average value of 
each variable in the different episodes and a band indicating one standard deviation 
from the mean. To facilitate the comparison between episodes, all the variables are 
normalised, taking the year before the start of the crisis as zero, with the exception of 
the GDP growth rate and inflation, which are expressed as deviations from their long-
term averages.6 
Finally, it should be noted that the exercise performed suffers from certain limitations. First, 
the sample is rather heterogeneous; in particular, the episodes considered include crises in 
both developed and emerging countries. As is well known, in periods of stress the emerging 
economies tend to have severe difficulty accessing financing, especially external financing, 
which tends to increase the magnitude of the adjustment. Second, the weighting and normal-
Methodological aspects
3  In the terminology of Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), these episodes are called “banking crises”.
4  The episodes considered include 15 cases of crisis in developed economies and 31 in emerging economies.
5  The variables used and their sources are as follows: real GDP (World Economic Outlook (WEO)); inflation: WEO 
and Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU); external balance (current-account balance): WEO; budget balance: WEO 
and EIU; gross public debt: WEO; rate of unemployment: World Bank, WEO and EIU; real effective exchange 
rate: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).
6  The normalisation is carried out in the following way: for series expressed in terms of year-on-year growth rates 
(GDP growth and inflation), the difference is calculated with respect to an average. For GDP, the average used 
corresponds to the GDP growth rates during the ten years preceding the crisis. For inflation this average is for 
the three preceding years. In the case of the other variables the value obtained in the year before the crisis is 
deducted, so that these variables have a value of zero at that point.
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ising criteria used do not take into account the economic weight of each country considered 
or the magnitude or depth of the different crises, so that the results reflect the dynamics of 
adjustment in response to an “average financial crisis”, but do not allow the effect of the in-
tensity of the crisis on the path of the macroeconomic variables to be assessed. Both limita-
tions mean that the results of the analysis should be interpreted with some caution. 
The current crisis is by no means the first financial crisis of the post-war period, although 
the severity and degree of synchronisation are unprecedented since the Great Depression. 
However, the current episode shares some of the characteristics of the recessions that 
have occurred in recent decades which, albeit more local and not so deep, have also been 
linked to financial crises. At the end of the last upturn, numerous developed countries (and 
some emerging ones) were in a situation marked by highly indebted private agents (as a 
result of a prolonged period of credit expansion) and overvalued assets. These features 
were also present, to a varying degree, in the financial crises of the last three decades and, 
for this reason, the pattern of the subsequent adjustment is of great interest.
The recovery process following a financial crisis (in comparison with those that take place 
following a recession caused by some other type of shock) is characterised by marked 
restructuring of company and household balance sheets, which contributes to the pro-
longed slackness of domestic demand, and the rebuilding of banks’ accounts. However, 
as mentioned in the introduction, the nature of the imbalances in the economy at the start 
of the crisis influences the path of the main macroeconomic variables in the recovery 
phase. In particular, external net borrowing at the start of the crisis (reflected in a current-
account deficit) is an important determinant of the dynamics of exit from the recession.
Charts 2 and 3 show the average paths for a set of macroeconomic variables in the period 
following the outbreak of a financial crisis, distinguishing between countries with a current-
account deficit at the start of the crisis and economies with an external surplus. The green 
bands give an idea of the dispersion of average behaviour and, therefore, of the signifi-
cance of the results. The main difference between the patterns of adjustment is due to the 
marked correction of the external deficit in those episodes that took place in deficit coun-
tries, while in the surplus economies not only did this correction not occur, but the external 
balance deteriorates slightly following the start of the crisis. 
The reason for the difference in behaviour is that in the case of deficit countries, in which 
the upturn is financed by external capital, financial crises lead to a decline in foreign capital 
inflows, which reduces the financing of the external deficit, forcing the private sector 
(households and firms) to reduce their consumption and investment.7 As indicated by 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), when recessions follow a prolonged expansion based on 
pronounced credit growth and capital inflows it is not uncommon for the banking crisis to 
end up causing a foreign exchange crisis (a twin crisis) in which foreign investors attempt 
to rapidly liquidate their domestic positions. As seen in Chart 2, in crises in deficit countries 
the intensity of the private-sector restructuring allows the deterioration in public finances 
associated with the crisis to be offset, so that the current-account balance improves rela-
tive to the previous situation. The fiscal deterioration observed is the result of the fall in tax 
revenues, caused by the contraction in activity and, in some cases, the increase in public 
spending (e.g. on unemployment subsidies). The fiscal stimulus measures adopted to con-
tain the crisis may also contribute to this fiscal deterioration, although funding difficulties 
The dynamics of 
macroeconomic 
adjustment following a 
financial crisis
THE ROLE OF THE EXTERNAL 
BALANCE: DEFICIT VERSUS 
SURPLUS COUNTRIES 
7  In some cases, mainly in emerging economies, there may even be a “sudden stop”. See, for example, Aguiar 
and Gopinath (2007).
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SOURCES: World Economic Outlook (WEO), Economist Intelligence Unit, OECD and World Bank.
a The green area is the area within one standard deviation of the mean (blue line). Both the mean and the standard deviation are calculated 
using the sample of countries available in each group. 
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usually lead, especially in emerging economies (and, in particular, in those with high net 
borrowing), to a contractionary bias in fiscal policy in periods of financial stress.8
In crises in surplus countries, the domestic savings available at the start of the crisis pro-
vided greater room for manoeuvre during the adjustment. Since they do not depend on 
external savings, these economies are less vulnerable to external shocks and have a 
greater capacity to implement stabilisation measures. Chart 3 shows (for the average crisis 
episode in current-account surplus countries) that the increase in the budget deficit is not 
offset by an improvement in private saving, so that, unlike in the case of deficit countries, 
there is no improvement in the external balance. Also notable in crises affecting surplus 
countries is the smaller contraction in GDP, which is also indicative of this larger scope for 
implementing policies to stimulate domestic demand.
Along with the dependence on external financing, another factor that influences the pat-
tern of adjustment following a financial crisis is the macroeconomic policy framework and, 
in particular, the exchange rate regime and the monetary policy strategy. Charts 4 and 5 
show the average pattern of adjustment following financial crises in deficit countries, ac-
cording to the exchange rate regime in force at the time of the crisis. In principle, countries 
with flexible exchange rates are more exposed to a sharp exchange-rate adjustment. 
However, economies with fixed exchange rates may also be subject to significant down-
ward pressures on the exchange rate, which may eventually lead to an exchange-rate 
crisis, if they do not succeed in defending the peg. As a corollary of the greater exchange 
rate variability, countries with flexible exchange rates have a greater capacity to use mon-
etary policy to combat the effects of the crisis. However, sometimes countries with flexible 
exchange rates have also had to implement contractionary monetary policies (interest rate 
increases) in situations of stress, in order to stem capital outflows. In addition, monetary 
expansion as a means of adjustment, although potentially useful to accommodate the real 
adjustment, may lead to the unanchoring of inflation expectations and, ultimately, to per-
sistently high inflation rates, which may eventually reduce long-term growth.9
The empirical evidence shows that, at the time of the crisis, deficit countries with flexible 
exchange rates experience a net capital outflow. This contributes to the depreciation of 
their nominal exchange rate and an improvement in their competitiveness, facilitating cor-
rection of the external deficit in the short term. As seen in Chart 4, the improvement in the 
current-account balance in crisis episodes in deficit countries with flexible exchange rates 
is on average 4% of GDP. At the same time, the depreciation has an inflationary impact 
and historical experience shows that central banks tend to accommodate this, leading to 
easier monetary conditions, either through lower nominal interest rates or by accommo-
dating the reduction in real interest rates caused by the increase in inflation. This expan-
sionary bias to monetary policy helps to mitigate the impact on the financial system and 
facilitate recovery. In the sample of episodes analysed, the rate of inflation stands on aver-
age 5 pp above its long-term average in the first year after the start of the crisis (see 
Chart 4). This increase in inflation partly offsets the nominal depreciation so that the real 
exchange rate depreciation is gradually reversed. This pattern of adjustment based on the 
reduction of real interest rates, basically driven by the increase in inflation, is conducive to 
a recovery in private demand in countries with flexible exchange rates. Another channel 
through which higher inflation boosts demand is by reducing the debt burden. However, 
this reduction depends on the percentage of debt in local currency. If the proportion of 
THE ROLE OF THE EXCHANGE 
RATE: FIXED VERSUS FLEXIBLE
8  See Alberola and Montero (2006).
9  For a review of the literature on the costs of inflation, see Woodford (2002).
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debt denominated in foreign currency is high, the exchange-rate depreciation may offset 
this impact and could even generate a severe deterioration in indebtedness.
On average, in the crisis episodes analysed in deficit countries with flexible exchange rates, 
the crisis generates a fall in GDP growth of 2 pp with respect to trend and an increase of 1 
pp in the rate of unemployment. For its part, the budget deficit increases by 2 pp in the sec-
ond year following the crisis. However, this trend is corrected from the third year, in line with 
the reduction in unemployment and the increase in the GDP growth rate, and the budget 
balance improves from the fourth year after the crisis. In the sample analysed, the crisis 
episodes in countries with flexible exchange rates generate less persistent negative effects, 
which disappear approximately three years after the crisis starts. The public debt-to-GDP 
ratio does not increase, despite the slight fiscal deterioration, owing to the impact of inflation 
on the stock of nominal debt, especially if it is predominantly denominated in local currency.
In the case of deficit countries with a fixed exchange rate regime at the start of the crisis, 
monetary policy should aim to maintain the exchange-rate commitment, and thereby influ-
ence the path of macroeconomic adjustment. In some cases (11 out of 24 in the sample) the 
exchange-rate peg was ultimately abandoned, generally against the initial wishes of the au-
thorities. The exchange-rate anchor and consequent restriction of monetary instruments, 
have notable advantages in periods of stability, but may hamper the stabilisation of the econ-
omy following a crisis, a lesson that has been well known since the Great Depression, as seen 
in Box 1. Chart 5 shows that, in the analysed sample of crisis episodes in countries with fixed 
exchange rates, the GDP growth rate falls on average by 4 pp relative to its long-term aver-
age, twice the fall with flexible exchange rates, and takes between three and five years to 
return to its historical level, while unemployment rises by 3 pp and recovers very slowly. How-
ever, both maintenance of the peg and the more contractionary monetary policy stance gen-
erate a fall in inflation with respect to its long-term average. The combination of a fixed ex-
change rate and lower inflation translates into a real exchange rate depreciation and, therefore, 
an improvement in the economy’s external competitiveness. This result suggests that the 
behaviour of the real exchange rate is more favourable than in countries with flexible rates 
where, as indicated, the nominal depreciation is partially offset by the increase in inflation. 
The deterioration in the budget balance as a percentage of GDP has also been more intense 
in adjustment episodes in countries with fixed exchange rates than in those with flexible rates. 
This may be due to the fact that in recovery phases in countries with exchange-rate commit-
ments the role of stimulating private demand falls to a greater extent to fiscal policy, as mon-
etary policy has little room for manoeuvre due to the defence of the peg. In addition, the 
combination of a larger fiscal deterioration with lower inflation entails a larger increase in the 
debt-to-GDP ratio (25 pp on average), as against what happens with flexible exchange rate 
regimes, when this ratio is reduced (see Chart 4). Finally, stricter monetary and financial con-
ditions are conducive to a more pronounced increase in private agents’ saving, which helps 
to improve the private balance and the external surplus. On average in the episodes analysed 
these balances increased by 10 and 5 pp, respectively, in relation to their pre-crisis levels. 
The financial crisis has hit a large number of economies, both developed and emerging, 
although the impact on the latter has generally been less intense and prolonged. The de-
gree of international synchronisation displayed makes it difficult to establish precise paral-
lels with previous episodes, but it is still useful to assess the extent to which economies’ 
recovery profiles following the start of the current crisis correspond with what one might 
expect from historical experience. The analysis of the patterns of adjustment in the three 
main developed economies (the United States, the euro area and the United Kingdom) 
The adjustment process in 
the developed economies 
in the current crisis in the 
light of historical 
experience
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BOX 1THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND THE PERSISTENCE OF THE GOLD STANDARD
The current financial crisis has been repeatedly compared with 
the Great Depression of 1929, not only because of its severity 
but also because of its financial origin and the ensuing pro-
tracted period of adjustment. In recent decades, research into 
this period of history has led to the emergence of a certain de-
gree of consensus in the academic world about its causes and 
the effectiveness of the various policies applied to resolve it, 
although there are divergent opinions and it remains a subject 
of investigation.1 It is also important to underline that in the 
wake of the Great Depression, Keynes developed his theory, 
the foundation for most of the macroeconomic toolkit. These 
tools have provided the basis, at different times, for economic 
policy design and have been effectively applied since the out-
break of the current crisis.
Although the Great Depression began in 1929, its origins date 
back to the end of the First World War, a decade earlier. During 
the war, many of the countries involved, had suspended the 
gold standard, under pressure from the fiscal needs of the war 
effort and the metal shortage. The gold standard had been in 
operation since approximately 1874 and guaranteed the con-
vertibility of national currencies into their equivalent in gold, 
which notably restricted the room for manoeuvre in terms of 
monetary policies which were subordinated to maintaining such 
parity. Although the suspension of the gold standard was based 
on an economic emergency, high inflation and the poor situa-
tion of the European economies made it difficult for it to be re-
introduced after the war. However, strong fluctuations in prices 
and exchange rates and the need to discipline fiscal expansion 
during the period 1919-25, convinced the authorities in most 
countries of the need to recover a nominal anchor to maintain 
stable inflation and exchange rates, as had occurred in the pre-
war period.2 Thus, throughout the 1920s, most European coun-
tries reintroduced the convertibility of their currencies into 
gold.3 The United Kingdom restored the gold standard in 1925, 
applying the pre-war parity, with the aim of recovering sterling’s 
role as a central currency before the war. The decision to main-
tain the previous parity meant a substantial revaluation of ster-
ling in real terms which triggered strong deflationary pressure 
and a recession. This favoured the United Kingdom’s main 
trade competitor, the United States, which significantly in-
creased its share in international trade and moved from a trade 
deficit to a trade surplus. The trade surplus, under the prevail-
ing gold standard, involved the inflow of gold into the United 
States which was reinvested in the form of loans to Germany 
and Austria. With these loans, the United States facilitated pay-
ment by Germany and Austria of the reparations to France and 
the United Kingdom pursuant to the Treaty of Versailles, and the 
latter, in turn, were able to repay their war debts to the United 
States.
This circuit of credit was favoured by the US Federal Reserve’s 
low interest rate policy. This combination of policies made it 
easier for price convergence between the United Kingdom 
(downwards) and the United States (upwards) against a back-
drop of coordination between the monetary authorities of these 
two countries. During this phase, the rising trend on the US 
stock market quickened, bolstered by the positive economic 
outlook and the inflow of fresh capital. Financial innovation and 
international market integration also contributed to this pro-
cess. Thus, for example, the leveraged purchase of shares in 
the United States became widespread, that is, it was possible 
to receive loans to buy shares (that in turn were used as collat-
eral). This encouraged a change in the direction of private finan-
cial flows from Europe to the United States, which caused fi-
nancial problems in countries like Germany.
The perception that economic growth was out of control 
prompted the Federal Reserve’s decision to tighten its mone-
tary policy to rein it back in. This stemmed the growth of the 
speculative market bubble and ultimately triggered the collapse 
of the US stock market and of other stock markets, leading to 
the 1929 stock market crash. From that moment, the stock 
market fall began to feed through to the US and world econo-
mies through a “financial accelerator” mechanism.4 The decline 
in asset prices compelled agents to settle positions to get cash 
and to improve solvency but this simultaneous settlement of 
positions depressed asset prices even further, reducing the 
value of the loan collateral. This triggered a rise in bank and 
business failures, reducing credit and the money stock and am-
plifying the effect of the recession.
Economic policies did not react suitably and the gold standard 
contributed to transmitting this process to an international 
scale, by magnifying it. The monetary contraction forced 
countries to raise their interest rates to avoid being left without 
gold reserves which tended to amplify the recessive and defla-
tionary effects of the depression. The United States, which 
had emerged after the war as the new central country in the 
monetary system, could have followed the example set by the 
United Kingdom in the twentieth century, by temporarily halt-
ing convertibility to increase liquidity in the system and acting 
as a “lender of last resort” to commercial banks and other cen-
1  This box does not attempt to review the large volume of existing litera-
ture but to provide a brief summary. The view expressed attempts to 
cover the most widely spread thesis, developed, inter alia, in Friedman 
and Schwartz (1963), Bernanke (1983), Romer (1992) and Eichengreen 
(1992). Other authors, such as Cole and Ohanian (2002), offer alternative 
explanations, underlining aspects such as the cartel system and the in-
crease in trade union negotiating power to explain the persistence of the 
recession.
2  There has been a dispute about whether the exchange rate instability 
during the period 1919-1925 was the cause of the economic instability, 
as held by Ragnar Nurske, or a consequence of it, as maintained by 
Milton Friedman. See Eichengreen (1996).
3  The first countries to reintroduce the convertibility of their currencies 
into gold were those which had experienced the effects of hyperinfla-
tion: Austria (1923), Germany and Poland (1924) and Hungary (1925). 
They were followed by the other large nations and their colonies: the 
United Kingdom and Belgium (1925), Italy (1927) and France (1928) 4  See Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2004).
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tral banks. However, the US authorities remained passive until 
well into the 1930s, which deepened the magnitude of the de-
pression and its duration. The chart in this box includes the 
main economic indicators of the United States in the period 
after 1929.
Exit from the crisis and the policies adopted varied greatly. In 
1931, countries like Austria and the United Kingdom aban-
doned the gold standard, which was accompanied by an eco-
nomic recovery in these countries resulting from the ensuing 
monetary expansion. Monetary expansion contributed to im-
BOX 1THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND THE PERSISTENCE OF THE GOLD STANDARD (cont’d)
THE US ECONOMY DURING THE GREAT DEPRESSION 
SOURCES: Federal Reserve of St. Louis and International Historical Statistics. 
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THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND THE PERSISTENCE OF THE GOLD STANDARD (cont’d) BOX 1
proving financing conditions and unblocked the credit supply, 
which facilitated the recovery of investment and consumption; 
on the other hand, abandoning the gold standard temporarily 
improved the external balance through the depreciation of the 
exchange rate; lastly higher inflation reduced the real amount of 
debt and made deleveraging easier. By contrast, countries like 
France which maintained convertibility into gold until 1936, saw 
their fragile economic situation drag on until the beginning of 
World War II.
In the case of the United States, the situation did not offer any 
signs of improving until the arrival of the new Roosevelt administra-
tion in 1933, which had undertaken to fight deflation. Therefore, it 
suspended convertibility into gold in 1933, permitting monetary 
expansion and the depreciation of the dollar. Secondly, it intro-
duced “bank holidays” by decree in order to rebuild the balance 
sheets of banks and wind up insolvent ones. Additionally, it an-
nounced an inflationary target for prices to rise to their pre-1929 
levels5 which triggered a strong rise in inflation and the beginning 
of the economic recovery from 1933. These decisions were ulti-
mately much more transcendent than the fiscal expansion, also 
introduced further to the New Deal, which was moderate owing to 
the scale of the recession according to most authors.6 
5  See Eggertsson (2008).
6  See Romer (1992) or Brown (1956). The government deficit never exceeded a 
maximum of 8% of GDP in 1934. However, when it started to contract again 
from 1937, it did contribute to the US economy falling back into recession.
shows that although they generally reflect the historical experience described in the previ-
ous sections in qualitative terms, there are some notable differences.
The adjustment in the British economy is perhaps the most similar to that recorded in pre-
vious episodes of financial crisis in deficit countries with flexible exchange rates. Following 
a very deep crisis (involving a GDP contraction of around 8 pp and a moderate increase in 
unemployment of about 2 pp) there was a sharp depreciation of the pound sterling and 
inflation rose to stand persistently above 4%. This relatively high inflation entailed, against 
the background of a relatively stable exchange rate, a real appreciation in the last year 
considered. Fiscal stimulus measures were reflected in a substantial increase in the budg-
et deficit. This was offset by the sharp adjustment in the private sector, which has become 
a significant net lender. As a result, the external balance has improved relative to the pre-
crisis period. 
The US economy, which has posted persistent current-account deficits (based on high 
levels of private-sector borrowing), has also suffered an intense crisis without any recent 
precedent: the GDP growth rate has fallen by around 4 pp relative to its historical average 
and unemployment has increased by some 5 pp with respect to its pre-crisis level. Unlike 
in the case of the pound sterling, the tendency for the dollar to depreciate has been mod-
est and there have been certain episodes of appreciation, associated with the persistently 
high level of uncertainty in the post-crisis period. This behaviour is strongly influenced by 
the central position of the United States in the international monetary system, resulting 
from the status of its currency as the safe haven instrument par excellence. At the same 
time, despite the easy monetary policy pursued by the Federal Reserve to boost eco-
nomic recovery (with official interest rates kept at slightly above zero and non-standard 
measures), inflation has still not reached its pre-crisis levels, in contrast to the historical 
experience. This aspect highlights the special nature of this financial crisis: the fragility of 
the financial system has blocked the monetary transmission mechanisms, causing the 
large amount of liquidity provided by the monetary authorities (in the United States and in 
the other advanced economies) to remain largely stuck on the balance sheets of central 
banks and financial institutions.
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SOUERCES: World Economic Outlook (WEO), Economist Intelligence Unit, OECD and World Bank.
a The green area shows the area within one standard deviation of the mean (blue line). Both the mean and the standard deviation are calculated using the sample of 
countries available in each group.
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The strong fiscal expansion has also been notable, with deficits of more than 10% of GDP. 
As in the British case, these were offset by an improvement in the private sector’s net lend-
ing, resulting in some correction of the external deficit. 
The euro area is a special case. In its entirety the area may be considered to be an economy with 
a flexible exchange rate and with a current account that has historically been roughly in balance. 
The recent financial crisis has been accompanied by a recession of similar intensity to the one in 
the United States in terms of output, although it has been less intense in terms of job destruction. 
As in the United States inflation has remained below its pre-crisis levels, but the exchange rate 
has tended to appreciate against the dollar, albeit with a high level of volatility, while in real effec-
tive terms it has see-sawed. At the start of the crisis the euro area had a slight surplus, but the 
pattern of domestic adjustment has been similar to that in the other two economies, which had 
a substantial external deficit. That is to say, there has been an increase in private saving which 
has offset the growth in the budget deficit in the period immediately after crisis. However, these 
movements have been less intense, especially in the case of the budget deficit, which has ena-
bled the increase in overall debt to be smaller than in the other two countries analysed. 
In the light of the historical evidence of the last three decades, the immediate impact of a finan-
cial crisis is a substantial reduction in the GDP growth rate, an increase in unemployment and 
a higher budget deficit. Apart from these common responses, the pattern of adjustment to a 
financial crisis varies in accordance with several factors, among which the external position of 
the economy and its exchange rate regime stand out. In countries with current-account defi-
cits, the financial crisis is accompanied by a sharp adjustment in the external position. In 
emerging economies, especially, this adjustment is usually exacerbated by a sudden stop in 
external financing (that may be more or less intense and prolonged), which forces the private 
sector to reduce its consumption and investment drastically, amplifying the recessionary effect 
of the crisis. In surplus countries, no significant external adjustment takes place, so that the 
increase in the budget deficit can be financed externally without the need for an increase in 
private saving or a reduction in investment.
The analysis also reveals that the adjustment tends to be briefer and smoother in economies 
with flexible exchange rates, assisted by the depreciation in the nominal exchange rate which, 
however, leads to a larger rise in inflation. The risks in this context lie in the possibility of an 
exchange rate crisis, which is especially damaging in economies with a high volume of foreign 
currency denominated debt, and in the possible unanchoring of inflation expectations, which 
may eventually have an impact on longer term growth. Moreover, in the medium term inflation 
erodes the competitiveness gains obtained. In the case of economies with fixed exchange 
rates, maintaining the exchange rate commitment limits the nominal adjustment, through 
lower exchange rates, and also the room for manoeuvre in the area of monetary policy. This 
tends to prompt a sharper real adjustment and also means that fiscal policy is the main instru-
ment for supporting the recovery. Both these factors lead to greater fiscal deterioration. How-
ever, the exchange-rate peg tends to be conducive to a low inflation environment and to 
greater discipline in the adjustment process which, in the long term, may be beneficial. 
In any event, the current crisis displays a number of differences when compared with those 
analysed in this article. First, it is global and – in the advanced economies –persistent, this 
being in contrast to previous financial crises, which were predominantly in emerging econo-
mies. The global nature of the crisis limits the possibility that external demand will smooth 
the adjustment. That said, the fact that the crisis has been centred on the developed coun-
tries, with their deeper and more internationally integrated financial markets, may have miti-
gated the intensity of the adjustment. Even so, the pattern of adjustment in the main 
Final considerations
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advanced economies is largely in line with the experience of previous episodes, which also 
show that a period of deleveraging by private agents is a prerequisite for exit from the crisis. 
The other fundamental difference when comparing with historical experience, is the relatively 
low level of inflation in the three economies analysed (all of which have flexible exchange rates), 
despite the notable expansion in liquidity during the crisis. This benign behaviour by inflation is 
without doubt partly attributable to the credibility of monetary policy. However, the severe 
shocks that the crisis (and its impact on financial systems) has generated in the transmission of 
monetary stimuli may also have mitigated the price pressures in some of these economies. 
Looking ahead, in addition to the central scenario of gradual recovery in the advanced 
economies and normalisation of the economic policy stance, there are two contrasting risk 
scenarios. The first would involve consolidation of the situation of financial paralysis and 
its negative interaction with the real economy. This could lead to a deflationary environ-
ment similar to the one following the Japanese crisis, which continues to prevail after two 
decades. In the second scenario the authorities would lose control of the normalisation of 
the financial and economic situation, which would eventually lead to an inflationary pro-
cess, due to the high levels of liquidity in the system, against a backdrop of large budget 
deficits. The best way of addressing these risks is for monetary policy to continue to be 
oriented towards the achievement of medium-term price stability.
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